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Introduction 
Looking back on her husband’s life, the wife of an enslaved man named Will declared: 
“Will sho’ly had hard luck.  He killed a white man in North Carolina and got off, and then was 
hung for killing a nigger in Mississippi.”1  Given his extraordinary circumstances, some would 
argue that Will had an abundant, albeit limited, amount of luck.  While his individual story ended 
in tragedy, it is still worth telling.  It is significant because the altercation in North Carolina, 
where he “killed a white man…and got off,” culminated in a court case, State v. Will, that had an 
effect beyond the scope of the lives of those involved.
2
  The incident had a positive effect in 
North Carolina slave law despite its violent origin. 
The court records show that on January 22, 1834, Will, a slave of James S. Battle, killed 
his overseer, Richard Baxter.  The series of events that led to his death began with a 
disagreement over a work tool.  Early that morning, Allen, the slave foreman, instructed a slave 
to use a hoe that Will “claimed to use exclusively on the farm on account of his having helved it 
in his own time.”  Because Will had probably made and attached the handle on his own, he did 
not want another slave to use it.  Allen and Will exchanged “some angry words,” and Will 
damaged the handle before he left to work at the cotton screw.  A likely aggravated Allen then 
reported what had happened to Baxter, the overseer.  Perhaps upset by Will’s disobedience, 
Baxter quickly entered his home and said something that made his wife comment, “I would not 
my dear.”  He proceeded to retrieve his shotgun and responded, “I will.”  Back outside, he told 
                                                 
1
 George Gordon Battle, “The State of North Carolina v. Negro Will, a Slave of James S. Battle: A Cause Celebre of 
2
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Court of North Carolina, From December Term, 1834, to June Term 1835, Both Inclusive, vol.1 (Philadelphia: P.H. 
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Allen that he “was going after the prisoner,” and to follow with a whip as Baxter rode his horse 
to where Will was working.
3
   
Baxter reached Will unobserved and his actions indicate that he might have wanted it that 
way.  Upon reaching the work area, he quickly descended from his horse and crossed the fence, 
gun in hand.  When Baxter approached him, Will was placing cotton into the screw.  Will 
obediently followed Baxter’s demand to come down from the cotton screw, and “took off his hat 
in an humble manner and came down,” after which the two traded indiscernible words.  In front 
of the three other slaves, Will began to run away.  He did not get more than “fifteen steps” before 
Baxter shot him in the back, with the load from the shotgun “covering a space of twelve inches 
square.”4    
 Despite the serious wound, Will miraculously continued to run as Baxter and the slaves, 
including Allen, pursued him.  Baxter told the slaves that Will “could not go far” and instructed 
them to catch him.  Baxter did not remain idle, either.  By use of both horse and foot, he tried to 
capture Will.  When Will saw Baxter, “he changed his course” to avoid him.  Eventually, Will’s 
injuries probably slowed him down because Baxter reached him and “collared him with his right 
hand.”  With his left thumb in Will’s mouth, Baxter told the slaves to grab Will, who held a 
knife.  Will struck at a slave who tried to aid Baxter but missed and instead slashed the 
overseer’s leg.  Baxter did not have any weapons with him at this point.  However, as Will 
attempted to free himself in the tussle that followed, he injured Baxter’s chest and delivered the 
ultimately fatal wound to his arm.  These actions allowed Will to continue his escape into the 
woods while Baxter remained injured on the ground.  At first Baxter ordered the slaves to chase 
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after Will but he then called them back.  He asserted, “Will has killed me; if I had minded what 
my poor wife said, I should not have been in this fix.”  He died later that night from the blood 
loss.
 5
 
Will faced the legal consequences the next day.  He did not have to be tracked down 
because Will had made his way back to the plantation and to his master, James Battle, on the 
same day of the altercation.  In what could have been a mixture of physical exhaustion and 
shock, news of Baxter’s death the next day left Will “so much affected that he came near 
falling.”  When he learned of Baxter’s death, he exclaimed, “Is it possible!”6    
At trial, the jury decided that Will committed the act that caused Baxter’s death, but 
could not decide if it was murder or manslaughter.  As a result, they declared what is labeled a 
“special verdict.”  The jury told the judge, “the said jurors are altogether ignorant, and pray the 
advice of the Court thereupon.”  The distinction of charges – “felony and murder” versus 
“feloniously killing and slaying” – meant the difference between life and death for Will.  With 
their special verdict, the jury left the critical decision in the judge’s hands.  Judge Donnell 
concluded that Will had committed murder, and sentenced him to death.  Fortunately, North 
Carolina’s laws entitled slaves to fair trials and legal processes, and because all death offenses 
were automatically appealed, Will’s case went before the North Carolina Supreme Court.7  In 
December of 1834, Justices William Gaston, Thomas Ruffin and Joseph John Daniel reviewed 
the case and unanimously came to the decision that Will did not act maliciously when he killed 
Baxter.  He acted in self-defense, in response to the “passion” natural to human beings when so 
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 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases, 123 (all). 
6
 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases, 124. 
7
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provoked.  This decision, with its acceptance of slaves’ humanity, would affect criminal slave 
cases in North Carolina in the years to come.
8
   
Slaves in the nineteenth-century American South inhabited a world that often struggled 
with their status as both “persons” and “property.”9  The tension between the two roles is readily 
apparent in many of the criminal cases involving slaves.  Historian Ariela Gross states in Double 
Character that “cases forced lawyers and judges to confront slaves’ moral agency.”10  In State v. 
Will, the acknowledgement of the slave’s personhood and “passions” saved his life.  The court 
made the decision after considering the dual roles Will occupied.  The author of the court 
opinion, Justice William Gaston, wrote, “The prisoner is a human being, degraded indeed by 
slavery, but yet having ‘organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions,’ like our own.”11  One 
of Will’s lawyers, Bartholomew F. Moore, stated that “no man, either bond or free, could so 
soon have quelled his fury, and recalled his scattered senses,” given the circumstances.12  The 
recognition of Will’s humanity did not excuse his behavior, however.  He was still a slave and 
subject to a different set of rules than white individuals.  Attorney General J.R.J. Daniel 
addressed the difference by commenting on Will’s position as property.  As a slave, Will “is 
regarded as property; may be the subject of traffic; [and] will pass under the description, goods 
and chattels.”13  Masters, the property owners, were endowed with extensive rights and 
privileges.  Accordingly, Daniel asked a question crucial to the case: “What right and 
dominion… by the laws of North Carolina, does the master possess over the slave?”14  The rights 
                                                 
8
 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases, 124. 
9
 Ariela J. Gross, Double Character (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3.  
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 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases at Law,140. 
13
 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases at Law, 155. 
14
 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases at Law, 153. 
6 
 
of the master were not absolute, and the restrictions were found in the very laws of North 
Carolina that Daniel mentioned. 
An analysis of State v. Will allows for the exploration of the function and evolution of the 
law of slavery in North Carolina.  The North Carolina legislature eventually protected the lives 
of slaves through statutes, however the decision made in Will’s favor was not inevitable.  It did, 
however, make sense given the development in North Carolina’s legal history.  Authors Joseph 
Kelly Turner and Jno L. Bridgers, Jr. stated that Will’s attorney, Bartholomew “Moore did not… 
argue so much from the point of law – which if it had been interpreted literally would have been 
decidedly against him – as he did the irresistible force of public opinion.”15  Their interpretation 
discredits Moore, who certainly did consider both the law and public opinion in the South. 
Whether the decision made in State v. Will relied only on “the point of law” or on other 
considerations as well requires an examination of the statutes and cases before 1834 that shaped 
slave law.  Statutes and the cases that enforced them both afforded slaves protection.  In the 1823 
case State v. Hale, Chief Justice John Louis Taylor of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
stated, “Reason and analogy seem to require that a human being, although the subject of 
property, should be so far protected as the public might be injured through him.”16  The 
legislature of North Carolina likely followed a similar line of reasoning when it passed the 
statutes of 1774 (Chapter XXXI), 1791 (Chapter IV), and 1817 (Chapter XVIII).
17
  Each of these 
statutes addressed the killing of slaves, and they show the progression of the law in North 
Carolina through increasingly strict penalties for doing so.  The cases State v. Tackett, State v. 
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 Joseph Kelly Turner and Jno L. Bridgers, Jr., History of Edgecombe County: North Carolina (Raleigh: Edwards & 
Broughton Printing Co., 1920), 173. 
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 State v. Hale, 9 N.C. 582; 1823 N.C. LEXIS 65; 2 Hawks 582 
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Hale and State v. Mann all reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina before State v. Will, 
and can provide insight into the judicial system at the time.   
An important backdrop to the actions of all the individuals – black and white – involved 
in State v. Will was the concept of honor in the antebellum South.  Southern honor shaped the 
expectations of the white men on the juries, on the judicial benches, and in the legislature.  
However notions of honor extended beyond the elite.
18
  Overseers and slaves, like Richard 
Baxter and Will, were part of the southern society and so they, too, operated within honor’s 
framework.
19
  The actions of all of those involved in State v. Will may be better understood with 
this context in mind.  How, and if, honor dictated the actions of James Battle, Will’s owner, is of 
particular interest.  He paid attorneys Bartholomew Figures Moore and George Washington 
Mordecai $1,000 to represent Will.  James Battle’s grandson, George Gordon Battle, later 
commented in an article that, “In those frugal days such a fee was very unusual, and the fact of 
its payment shows Mr. Moore’s eminence and Mr. Battle’s desire to do his full duty toward the 
unfortunate defendant.”20  Financial considerations did not spur his ‘desire,’ because it did not 
make economic sense for James Battle to spend that much on Will’s defense.  In 1835, Battle 
could have purchased a male slave for $600, and yet he risked $1,000 on an uncertain outcome.
21
  
Evidently, there were other factors involved in his decision.  In 1846, a report by a committee in 
the Alabama Agricultural Society commented that, “the master has a ‘duty to know how his 
slaves are treated, and to protect them against cruelty.’”22  If Battle saw himself as a patriarch 
and honorable man, and one appealed to because of his justice, he might have believed he was 
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 Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 13; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, 
Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), xv. 
19
 Gross, Double Character, 4. 
20
 Battle, “The State of North Carolina v. Negro Will,” 518. 
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 John S. Bassett, The Southern Plantation Overseer (Reprint, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 47-48. 
22
 William E. Wiethoff, Crafting the Overseer’s Image (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2006), 23. Emphasis in original.   
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obligated to act.  If he thought he failed in his duty to protect his slave from a wicked overseer, 
his honor certainly may have prompted him to make amends by providing Will with a quality 
defense.   
Historians have spent ample time studying white honor and slave agency in recent 
decades.  While it does not mention State v. Will, Ariela Gross’s Double Character does address 
both of these issues.  Gross focuses on civil cases in the Deep South – particularly cases 
involving the slave market.  She makes clear that slaves did have a degree of agency, especially 
in the legal system and court room.  Moreover, in the legal system, slaves could implicitly 
challenge a white man’s honor.  Gross states that “despite the law’s power to erase slaves’ 
agency, to silence their words, and to dishonor them, courtroom disputes also gave slaves power 
to throw their masters’ honor into question.”23  She contends that this potent mix of agency and 
honor challenged the entire system, because “both law and honor culture found the moral agency 
of slaves threatening, but it was in the legal arena that white men were forced to confront the 
contradictions such agency raised.”24  Gross’s work serves an important function with her ideas 
about agency and honor, and these issues can be explored in State v. Will. 
Historians Bertram Wyatt-Brown and Edward Ayers have written about southern honor 
and its manifestation in society, as well.  In Southern Honor, Bertram Wyatt-Brown examined 
honor’s origins, what honor meant in southern society, how it affected family and gender 
relations, and its impact on social structures.  “Honor in the Old South applied to all white 
classes,” he noted.25  In his work The Shaping of Southern Culture, Wyatt-Brown stated that 
“slaves, like their masters, [also had] a sense of honor that applied to their sphere, constricted 
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 Gross, Double Character, 66. 
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 Gross, Double Character,73. 
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 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 88. 
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though their autonomy was.”26  The spheres overlapped when there was white and slave 
interaction.  Slaves were expected to show respect to whites.  “The ethic of honor required the 
unfeigned willingness of slaves to bestow honor on all whites.  For instance, if slaves merely 
pretended to offer respect, the essence of honor would be dissolved… Hence it was important 
that blacks show obedience with apparent heartfelt sincerity.”27  In Vengeance and Justice, 
Edward Ayers comments that honor “led people to pay particular attention to manners, to 
ritualized evidence of respect.”28  He makes clear that “to men of all classes, public opinion 
dictated that they not tolerate affront,” and so a slave’s disrespect toward a white man would 
require reprisal.
29
  
 In addition to the scholarship on honor, the case of State v. Will must be understood 
within the historiography on the broader law of slavery in the South, especially the works of 
Eugene D. Genovese, Mark V. Tushnet, and Paul Finkelman.  In Eugene Genovese’s 
comprehensive work, Roll, Jordan, Roll, he stated that, “In southern slave society, as in other 
societies, the law, even narrowly defined as a system of institutionalized jurisprudence, 
constituted a principal vehicle for the hegemony of the ruling class.”30  Unsurprisingly then, 
Genovese said that “the slaveholders as a socio-economic class shaped the legal system to their 
interests.”31  Historian Adam Rothman notes how Genovese described the South as a pre-
capitalist, paternalistic society.  Rothman attributes Roll, Jordan, Roll as the central and starting 
cause for “the recent debate… of modern U.S. slavery historiography.”32  He writes, “To be sure, 
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 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture: Honor, Grace, and War, 1760s-1880s (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 3. 
27
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 363. 
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 Ayers, Vengeance and Justice, 19. 
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 Ayers, Vengeance and Justice, 13. 
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 Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York: Random House, Inc., 1974), 26. 
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 Genovese, Roll, 27. 
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 Adam Rothman,"Slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction" (American History Association, 2012), 2. 
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historians have challenged Genovese’s interpretation on a number of fronts.”33  Some of the 
areas of disagreement have been the degree of paternalism that existed and the hegemonic 
function of the law.
34
 
Once a student of Genovese’s, Mark V. Tushnet writes in Slave Law in the American 
South how “slavery was a social system, an economic system, and a legal system.”35  Because 
slavery’s influence extended beyond the slaveholder, the law of slavery served a crucial function 
in southern society.  Its importance did not mitigate its complexity.  In The American Law of 
Slavery, 1810-1860, Tushnet discusses how concerns about slaves as property conflicted with 
those for slaves as humans, and how “the law thus reproduced the contradictions of southern 
slave society.”36  Judges had to consider statutes that their states’ legislatures passed, as well as 
the absence of statutes concerning certain situations.  Tushnet says the combination of statutes 
and judicial decisions, “in addition to defining norms and limits… with varying explicitness,” 
created “the structures of sentiment and reason used to rationalize – to order and to explain – 
slave society.”37  
In his work, The Law of Freedom and Bondage: A Casebook, scholar Paul Finkelman 
presents an assortment of slave cases and statutes that demonstrate how judges handled certain 
legal problems.  Some of these problems arose “when southern judges attempted to apply 
common law precedents and procedures to cases involving slaves,” Finkelman writes.38  In his 
focus on State v. Will, Finkelman posits questions that connect the case to an earlier one, State v. 
                                                 
33
 Rothman, “Slavery,” 3. 
34
 Rothman, “Slavery,” 3. 
35
 Mark V. Tushnet, Slave Law in the American South (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 6. 
36
 Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 6. 
37
 Tushnet. American Law of Slavery, 6.  
38
 Finkelman, Casebook, 191. 
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Mann, and whether Will contradicted it.
39
  Most importantly, however, his work serves as great 
resource to examine North Carolina’s law of slavery and show how “by 1860 slave defendants 
had many of the rights – such as right to counsel… – that were not guaranteed to all Americans 
until decisions by the Warren Court in the 1960s.”40 
 The development of crime and punishment in relation to the law of slavery in North 
Carolina has been explored by several historians.  Ernest James Clark, Jr., Bryce R. Holt, and 
John Harris Kellam have written Master’s theses that have explored the law and cases brought to 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.  In Slave cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court, 
1818-1858, Clark addresses the North Carolina statutes and cases that concerned death and 
assault committed by, or against, slaves.  He argues that State v. Will is evidence of North 
Carolina’s liberal approach toward slave law.  The broad conclusion Clark comes to after 
examining all of these cases is that, “It is an incontrovertible fact that the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina displayed liberality toward slaves in all cases involving their personal security as 
human beings.”41  His conclusion is too generous and is hampered by his use of extreme 
language (“incontrovertible fact,” “all cases”).  While judges applied liberality in several North 
Carolina cases, including State v. Will, the 1829 case State v. Mann alone can disprove his 
conclusion.  Holt’s The Supreme Court of North Carolina and Slavery incorporated statutes and 
cases related to slave law, as well.  Holt noted the importance of State v. Will in slightly less 
decisive terms.  He wrote, “The case was a notable one, and it served as a notice to all that the 
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 Finkelman, Casebook, 227. 
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 Finkelman, Casebook, 192. 
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 Ernest James Clark, Jr., “Slave cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court, 1818-1858” (Master’s thesis, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1959), 124.  
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life of the slave would be protected by the Court.  The decision, then, must have raised the status 
of the slave in the eyes of all well-disposed citizens, at least.”42 
John Harris Kellam’s Master’s thesis, The Evolution of Slave Law in North Carolina: 
Supreme Court decisions, 1800-1860, is similar to the work of Clark and Holt.  Kellam’s thesis 
focuses on North Carolina Supreme Court cases that related to “property, personal rights of 
African Americans, manumission, and homicide and assault,” and how they changed over time.43  
He concludes that “the texts of slave cases make it apparent that slave law in North Carolina was 
not established as a guide for the judicial branch.  Instead, the judiciary actually guided the 
development of the categories of slave law.”44  He argues it was because “the justices were free 
from the influence of local sentiment [and] were free to pass down decisions without being 
influenced by the pressures of the local communities.”45  Kellam explains that this seeming 
freedom did not prevent their “concerted effort to maintain the status quo of the master-slave 
relationship and of North Carolina’s social hierarchy,” even if some of “their decisions reflected 
an effort to afford the slave a more equitable legal avenue.”46  As Tushnet notes in Slave Law in 
the American South, “statutes left open many questions, which the courts answered by 
interpreting the statutes or, sometimes, by reverting to the common law.”47 
Historian A.E. Keir Nash discusses the treatment slaves received in legal proceedings in 
his articles “Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the 
Old South” and “A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the 
                                                 
42
 Bryce R. Holt, The Supreme Court of North Carolina and Slavery (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1970. Originally 
a Master’s thesis, Duke University, 1924), 21. 
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(Master’s thesis, Wake Forest University, 1992), vi. 
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 Kellam, “Evolution of Slave Law,” 145. 
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 Kellam, “Evolution of Slave Law,” 121. 
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Antebellum Negro.”  He addresses treatment of slaves in southern appellate courts in general, 
and in North Carolina’s Supreme Court specifically.  Nash finds that “virtually all [appellate] 
judges applied at least the benefits of strict procedural formalism so that indictments were 
quashed under the same or stricter rules of construction than were applied to whites.”48  He 
acknowledges that this stands in contrast to the common belief that in the antebellum South, 
African Americans, slave or not, had no or very little recourse.
49
  It is, of course, true that 
African Americans and slaves were often treated horribly and many episodes never reached a 
courtroom.
50
  Mark Tushnet quotes Eugene Genovese to say how “slave cases [have] ‘positive 
value … not in the probability of scrupulous enforcement but’” to demonstrate that the courts 
placed real value on fair practices.
51
  Still, Nash reiterates in “A More Equitable Past?” that, 
“Between the end of the eighteenth century and the Civil War, and particularly between 1830 
and 1860, southern
52
 state supreme courts sought almost without exception to expand protection 
of the Negro.”53  To help support his findings, he addresses North Carolina and certain justices 
on the North Carolina Supreme Court in both articles.  He notes how Chief Justice John Louis 
Taylor and Associate Justice Leonard Henderson by 1823 “had [successfully] done as much to 
help the southern slave as any American up to that point,” 54 by ruling that an unjustified battery 
of a slave by a white man who was not his master was a crime in State v. Hale.
55
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 A.E. Keir Nash, “Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South,” 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Feb., 1970), 66. 
49
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50
 A.E. Keir Nash, “A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro,” 
North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48 (Feb., 1970), 233. 
51
 Tushnet, American Law of Slavery, 18. 
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The outcome reached in State v. Will has been recognized by historians in how it helped 
slaves, as well.  While many historians have commented on State v. Will and how it was an 
important case that favored slaves, they have not always been correct in reproducing the details.  
In his coverage of State v. Will in Roll, Jordan, Roll, Genovese had some errors.  He stated that 
Baxter retrieved his gun after Will began to run away from him when Baxter had his gun the 
entire time.  He also said that Will “entered a plea of innocent by reason of self-defense.”  In 
fact, his attorneys argued no such thing – they argued his crime was manslaughter, not justifiable 
homicide.  Therefore the court did not “[overturn] Will’s conviction and [sustain] the plea,” as 
Genovese suggested.  Another matter in contention is Genovese’s statement that State v. Will 
“contradicted the philosophy” in Ruffin’s decision in State v. Mann.  As Justice Gaston stated in 
State v. Will, the issues at hand in the cases were two distinct legal matters.  Finally, Genovese 
contended that James Battle sold Will down to Mississippi “on the assumption that Will’s life 
would be unsafe from extralegal white retaliation.”  He did not present any evidence that 
suggests this is the case, and Battle’s own grandson stated the reason Battle moved Will was 
only “to remove him from the scene of so much tragedy.”56 
This thesis on State v. Will differs in its focus on the influence of the honor system in 
southern society, as well as slaves’ dual roles as persons and property.  Essentially, State v. Will 
turned on how much of the slaves’ humanity would be accepted in North Carolina’s law-
regulating society, which was based on slavery.  The attorney general and attorneys for Will all 
recognized the implications the case could have for slavery in North Carolina.  Despite fears of 
insubordination and eventual emancipation, the court acknowledged slaves’ passions in 
potentially fatal interactions with their masters.  The thesis will attempt to answer why the court 
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 Genovese, Roll, 36 (all); Battle, “The State of North Carolina v. Negro Will,” 530. 
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ruled the way it did and how the outcome was significant.  As the thesis will show, legal 
precedents and a sense of liberalism supported the court’s decision.  In turn, the decision 
supported the outcomes of later slave cases, to the benefit of the slaves. 
To make these arguments, the first chapter of the thesis provides a history of North 
Carolina’s legal and judicial history that will show how State v. Will fits in with the gradual 
progress characteristic in its society.  At the same time, it may become clear that its outcome was 
not predetermined.  Chapter 2 will then examine the individuals involved in the case, and how 
their actions relate to the southern honor system.  In Chapter 3, the court record and arguments 
therein will be discussed and analyzed.  Finally, in the conclusion, the significance of State v. 
Will through State v. Hoover, Martha Copeland v. John F. Parker, State v. Caesar, and State v. 
Christopher Robbins will be explained to show that State v. Will had a positive effect in the law 
of slavery in North Carolina.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Chapter 1. Life and Law in Early Nineteenth-Century North Carolina 
The context in which the North Carolina State Supreme Court decided State v. Will is 
important to fully understand the significance of the ruling.  It is necessary to examine the 
criminal statutes that concerned slaves, previous slave cases, and North Carolina’s politics and 
culture at the time of the decision.  In the legal arena, the nature of the members of the legislature 
as well as that of the justices had an impact on the outcomes in slave law.  Historian G.G. 
Johnson wrote about the two distinct approaches in the legislature.  The first approach 
encompassed “the liberal group… motivated by the Revolutionary doctrine of ‘the natural rights 
of man,’ [who] sought constantly to liberalize the slave code.”57  The other group was comprised 
of those who believed that slaves’ submission rested on the existence of strict laws.58  Over time, 
the law did increase its protection of slaves.  At that point, the nature of the justices who would 
interpret and enforce those laws took precedence.  Often, when there existed a “conflict between 
the law’s logic and the heart’s morality,” it became the deciding factor.59   
Laws regarding slavery in North Carolina underwent gradual changes between the mid-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which slowly allowed for the consideration that slaves were 
not vastly different than the white men around them.  In the June term of 1823, Judge Henderson 
in State v. Reed represented the hesitancy in acknowledging such a fact.  He said, “That a slave is 
a reasonable, or more properly a human being, is not, I suppose, denied.”60  Eleven years later, 
Attorney General J.R.J. Daniel in State v. Will recognized that slaves were human but were still 
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“regarded as property.”61  In December 1823, Chief Justice Taylor seemed to offer a compromise 
in State v. Hale with the thought that, “Reason and analogy seems to require that a human being, 
although the subject of property, should be so far protected as the public might be injured 
through him.”62  How to protect, punish and judge slaves’ acts in the statutes and courts of North 
Carolina partially depended on how much of their humanity the court accepted.  The right to 
their mere existence had not always been granted to them.  After the North Carolina legislature 
enacted laws to protect slaves’ basic right to life, courts had to decide the impact it would have 
on transgressions between slaves and white men.  In cases where the slave was either a victim or 
a perpetrator, courts considered the manner of communication and behavior in their associations 
with the whites in question.  A jury’s decision also depended on laws that extended or limited 
slaves’ rights while in the courtroom. 
While it still recognized slaves as property, North Carolina law progressed over time in 
its consideration of slaves’ worth as human beings.  In State v. Will, one of Will’s attorneys, 
George W. Mordecai, stated that in the years prior to 1741, slaves were “regarded in [North 
Carolina] as mere chattels, and not only the master or owner, but any person might kill them, 
however maliciously, without subjecting himself in the case of the master or owner to any 
[criminal] penalty whatever.”63  In 1741, North Carolina passed a statute that allowed for an 
owner to present the worth of his slave and receive compensation if authorities killed his slave 
while breaking up illegal activities.
64
  In the midst of the Revolutionary struggle the legislature 
passed a new act in 1774, however it continued to consider the killing of slaves chiefly “as a loss 
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of property.”65  In the 1774 law’s Chapter 31, it stated: “If any person shall be guilty of willfully 
and maliciously killing a slave, so that, if he had in the same manner killed a freeman, he would 
[be]… deemed guilty of murder.”66  On the first conviction, a punishment of a year in jail would 
be pronounced and the convicted individual had to pay the owner what the slave was worth.  
After a second conviction, perpetrators were said to be murderers and faced the death penalty.  
While the 1774 statute was an improvement, the North Carolina legislature “eloquently 
criticized” it in its preamble to the 1791 revision of the law because it treated the murder of a 
white man and a slave, “one who is equally an human creature,” differently.67 
The later statutes of 1791 and 1817 illustrated North Carolina’s attempts to increase the 
punishment for killing slaves.  The statute of 1791 made the “[willful] and [malicious] killing 
[of] a slave” a murder offense on the first conviction, and those guilty of it would “suffer the 
same punishment as if he had killed a free man.”68  The 1791 statute failed to have the intended 
effect, though, for the court deemed it to be “too uncertain to warrant the court in passing 
sentence of death upon prisoner[s] convicted under it” in the 1802 case, State v. Boon.69  For this 
reason, it “was never carried into execution.”70  It was not until the statute of 1817 that the law 
technically deemed killing a slave to be homicide.
71
  Three years later in State v. Tackett, 
attorney Seawell claimed that the 1817 statute “had no other effect than to… create the offence 
of manslaughter, as applied to the homicide of slaves,” because “before that act, the killing [of] a 
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slave was either murder or nothing.”72  The statute, Judge Henderson wrote, “places [the slave] 
within the peace of the State, so far as regards his life.”73  Legally, the protection of slaves’ lives 
increased because of the broader categorization, as did the penalty for violating that boundary. 
 Although North Carolina law protected slaves’ lives, there were many factors that the 
court considered in determining the guilt of a perpetrator, whether white or slave.  One of the 
factors was the manner and method of communication between the slave and freeman.  White 
southerners believed submission from slaves to be very important.  In State v. Hale, Chief Justice 
Taylor insisted that a slave’s tendency was usually to be submissive and acquiesce “to his 
master’s will.”74  Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown wrote, “The eyes witnessed honor and looked 
down in deference or shame. Thus a steady gaze from a slave signaled impudence.”75  If a gaze 
could cause offense, an apparently disrespectful word or action certainly warranted a response in 
the eyes of white southern men.  Free white men reportedly “early learn that tamely to submit to 
words of reproach from a slave is degrading to the last degree, and that a blow, even the 
slightest, is the greatest dishonor,” argued Seawell in State v. Tackett.76  In the 1820 case, the 
court granted defendant Tackett a new trial, in part, to be able to present to the jury “evidence 
that the deceased,” a slave, “was turbulent; that he was insolent and impudent to white 
persons.”77  Tackett’s lawyer contended that free white men such as his client were brought up 
“to look for humility and obedience in a slave.”78  Courts acknowledged qualities of submission 
and good behavior.  In State v. Will, the court record notes that when Richard Baxter ordered 
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Will to come down from his work to talk to him, Will “took off his hat in [a] humble manner and 
came down.”79  Indications of obedience and respect were likely very important to an all white 
jury in determining guilt and innocence.   
North Carolina statutes that applied to slaves in the courtroom are another important 
factor in how slaves fared and how juries and judges reached decisions.  In 1793, the North 
Carolina legislature passed a statute, and “reaffirmed in 1821 and 1836, [which] required that 
‘…trials of slaves in the county courts, shall be conducted under the same rules regulations and 
restrictions, as trials of free men.’”80  This statute afforded slaves the protection of a formal, legal 
process.  The act of 1807, which also concerned similar treatment for slaves and whites in the 
courts, created the result that “slaves received their first avenue of appeal when their punishment 
extended to ‘life, limb or member.’”81  In 1816, the legislature assigned capital cases to the 
superior courts, and like the statutes of 1793 and 1807, it reaffirmed that slaves were entitled to 
trials which “shall be conducted in the same manner, and under the same rules, regulations and 
restrictions, as trials of freemen for a like offense are now conducted.”82  So while slaves 
operated within the court system in fairly similar ways to whites, by having access “to trial by 
jury, counsel, challenge of jurors, and appeal to the Supreme Court,” a major difference did 
exist.
83
  Slaves and free blacks could not testify against a white person.
84
  A.E. Keir Nash states 
that “barring Negro testimony immodestly disadvantaged the black grievant,” because he might 
be the only witness to a crime committed by a white individual, and the law did not allow him to 
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speak out.
 85
  Ariela Gross believes that slaves considered the prohibition of slave testimony 
against whites to “most [guarantee] their disempowerment.”86 
The cases that reached the North Carolina State Supreme Court prior to State v. Will can 
be examined in light of the laws of North Carolina and certain issues important in the legal 
proceedings in which slaves were involved.  In 1820, the court applied the statute of 1817 for the 
first time in its decision in State v. Tackett.  A jury found Tackett guilty of murdering a slave 
named Daniel, according to the statute of 1817.  Tackett and Daniel were acquainted under 
unfavorable circumstances.  Tackett “kept” Daniel’s free African American wife, when he 
worked on the land in which she lived.  Previous to the fatal altercation, the two men had a 
physical dispute and threatening words were exchanged.  Two weeks later, Tackett shot Daniel 
after returning home to find Daniel lying outside his house.  In the initial court proceeding, the 
judge told the jury to consider the crime with the statute of 1817 in mind, which meant to 
consider it as if Daniel had been a white man.  The judge also did not allow Tackett to present 
evidence of Daniel’s “[turbulence], … [insolence] and [impudence] to white people.”87  The jury 
heeded the judge’s charge and convicted Daniel.  On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
determined that Tackett should have been able to present evidence of Daniel’s behavior.  The 
court stated, “it exists in the very nature of slavery, that the relation between a white man and a 
slave is different from that between free persons; and therefore, many acts will extenuate the 
homicide of a slave, which would not constitute a legal provocation if done by a white person.”88  
The 1817 statute, Judge Taylor said, allowed for the punishment of the manslaughter of a slave.  
“It cannot be laid down as a rule, that some of these provocations, if offered by a slave, well 
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known to be turbulent and disorderly, would not extenuate the killing, if it were instantly done 
under the heat of passion, and without circumstances of cruelty,” he determined.89   
In 1823, the North Carolina Supreme Court reached a decision in State v. Hale that 
adhered to the logic of State v. Tackett, with slightly more favorable results for slaves.  The case 
concerned an incident in which a white man hit a slave without justification.  Because the assault 
was not justified, the court considered the act to be a crime.  Judge Taylor wrote that it was an 
indictable offense because it “is injurious to the citizens at large by its breach of the peace, by the 
terror and alarm it excites, by the disturbance of that social order which it is the primary object of 
the law to maintain, and by the contagious example of crimes.”90  Owners of affected slaves 
might seek violent redress, and the ability of slaves to perform their work could be diminished.  
The decision the court made in State v. Hale did create more protection for slaves, however it 
still allowed for justified assault and battery of slaves by those not the slaves’ owners.  A.E. Keir 
Nash states that this “extended the common law yet further” in its application to slave cases.91 
Slaves did not receive any tangible benefit from the 1829 decision in State v. Mann.
92
  
The case presented a situation in which a man named John Mann hired a slave, Lydia, for one 
year.  During this time, Mann attempted to punish Lydia for some minor infraction and she tried 
to run away.  When she did not stop upon instruction to do so, he shot her.  She lived, however 
Mann found himself charged with battery.  The judge instructed the jury that if they believed 
Mann’s action to be “cruel and unwarrantable, and disproportionate to the offense committed by 
the slave, that in law the Defendant was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave.”93 
The jury found Mann guilty, and so he took his case to the state supreme court.  Justice Thomas 
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Ruffin, in his opinion for the court, utilized a rational but harsh application of the law.  The court 
found that Mann had the same authority of a master for the time he hired Lydia.  As master, 
Mann could not be guilty of the battery of Lydia, for “the power of the master must be absolute, 
to render the submission of the slave perfect.”94  Ruffin acknowledged the severity of the rule, 
but stated that “in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy.”95  Mark 
Tushnet refers to Ruffin’s position in State v. Mann as “a proslavery judge looking into the heart 
of the law of slavery, and doing so unflinchingly despite what he saw there.”96  The only 
limitations in place were those enacted by the legislature, which meant that the master could not 
kill his slave.
 97
  Deaths of slaves caused by “moderate correction” were not punishable in the 
statutes.
98
  Because Lydia did not die from her wound, Mann was not guilty of a crime.   
The laws of North Carolina that affected slaves improved in their favor in certain respects 
over time, however due to external events and concerns, other laws became more stringent.   
Historian Julius Yanuck marks 1830 as a year that separates different approaches in how slaves 
were treated in North Carolina.
99
  Prior to 1830, he says that laws governing slave behavior were 
not as strict as they would be after 1830.
100
  Some of the reasons include an anticipated rise in 
slaves’ worth and concerns caused by abolitionists that slaves might rebel, both of which led 
North Carolina to enact stronger regulations.
101
  Another cause for concern to many white North 
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Carolinians was the increase in volume of free blacks in their state.
102
  In 1830, the number 
exceeded 19,000, which was 12,000 more than in 1800.
103
  In addition to the large number of 
free blacks, slaves occupied close to one-third of the population in 1830 North Carolina.
104
  The 
combination of these two numbers could easily unsettle the concerns of the white population 
around them. 
A.E. Keir Nash identifies four specific events between 1829 and 1832 that unnerved 
North Carolina society and caused the change in its approach toward slaves.
105
  The first event 
was the distribution in 1829 of David Walker’s Appeal in Four Articles, which “[urged] slaves to 
revolt.”106  Walker caused alarm because “he warned white Americans… [that] they should not 
be deceived by the ‘outwardly servile character of the Negro’ … for there was ‘a primitive force 
in the black slave that, once aroused, will make him a magnificent fighter.’”107  North Carolina 
Governor John Owen showed the state legislature the document in 1830, and it prompted 
“legislature [to enact] statutes revamping the patrol system and prohibiting the instruction of 
slaves in reading and writing.”108  Professor Sally Hadden states that Walker’s Appeal did not 
reach North Carolina as quickly as it did states such as Georgia and Virginia, however Thomas 
“Ruffin, through letters or the newspaper of his cousin in Richmond, almost certainly knew 
about David Walker’s pamphlet while drafting the State v. Mann opinion.”109  Hadden remarks 
that Ruffin’s opinion provided a response to potential outcomes of the Appeal’s arrival in his 
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state.  “If Walker’s pamphlet reached the hands of slaves, Ruffin would not add the authority of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court to sanction a slave’s violent outburst.  Ruffin’s opinion in 
Mann must be so clear, so plain, that it could never be blamed for ‘instigating’ a slave to cross 
words with his master.”110  Ruffin worried about the aftereffects, however North Carolina did not 
want to give slaves the opportunity to have access to such work.  In 1830, the state enacted “a 
heavy penalty, imprisonment, the pillory, and whipping for the first offense and death for the 
second,” for any individual found guilty of distributing incendiary works in order “to excite the 
Negroes to conspiracy or resistance.”111  
 The remaining three events Nash indicates as causes for North Carolina tightening its 
hold are: “the first publication of William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator on January 1, 1831, 
and the Nat Turner rebellion of 1831,” which resulted in the fourth event, “the Virginia Slavery 
Debates of 1831-1832.”112  Garrison’s Liberator served as “active anti-slavery propaganda,” 
according to historian John Bassett.
113
  Fear of slaves acting on what men like Walker and 
Garrison advocated for became real after what Wyatt-Brown called, “Nat Turner’s bloody trail 
across Southampton County, Virginia.”114  There had been many conspiracies and worries 
throughout the antebellum South, however this event “was not a figment of popular hysteria,” 
Wyatt-Brown noted.
115
  The number of whites Turner’s “band” killed amounted to between fifty-
five and sixty.
116
  Even after the panic his rebellion caused and the concerns raised by the 
Virginia Slavery Debates, the fair processes of North Carolina law prevailed.  When conspiracies 
of slave plots in the wake of Turner’s Rebellion resulted in the arrest of slaves in North Carolina, 
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Johnson reported that, “Fortunately for the accused… under the act of 1816, [they] had to await 
the regular term of superior court unless the governor granted a special court of oyer and 
terminer.”117  The wait allowed “the feelings of whites to cool considerably.”118 
For cases that reached the courts, the justices on the North Carolina Supreme Court had 
the responsibility to make legal decisions with the particular case, relevant statutes, court 
precedents, and public opinion in mind.  A.E. Keir Nash says that, “While the judge may not 
have been wholly unaware of the general import of his decision-making, it seems likely that he 
was far more occupied with the general problem of defending slavery in a hostile national 
environment.”119  Justice Thomas Ruffin is an example of someone who wanted to shape slave 
law to make it more effective for slavery.  Scholar Robert Cover indicated Ruffin concerned 
himself with “the perpetuation of a secure master-slave relationship, with an emphasis on 
security.”120  A professor of Communication and Culture, William Wiethoff writes in A Peculiar 
Humanism that judicial opinions in appellate cases supported the characteristics held dear by the 
upper class.
121
  “Professional judges, whose holdings typically included at least a few slaves if 
not hundreds, ranked in the upper classes of both the Upper and Deep South.”122  As slave-
owners themselves and men of influence, the decisions the justices reached in slave cases were 
carefully considered.  Wiethoff comments that judges “were expected not only to reach just 
decisions but also to promote the justice they were dispensing,” which increased the value of 
their “oratorical form.”123  The form their opinions took and content contained therein “provided 
a barometer for the social concerns of the state’s white population,” John Harris Kellam states, 
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because of the substantial weight placed on “protecting master’s property rights and protecting 
the wellbeing of society.”124  With the entire state populace – from slave owners down to the 
slaves themselves – potentially impacted by their decisions, the significance of the justices’ 
position is clear. 
The importance of the North Carolina Supreme Court and its justices was substantial, 
even though the duration of the court’s history was not.  The North Carolina Supreme Court, 
which heard only matters of appeal, did not exist until 1818.
125
  Historian E.J. Clark, Jr. states the 
General Assembly passed the bill, “largely through efforts of William Gaston.”126  Starting in 
1799, judges from the state’s superior courts met twice a year to come to consensus on 
undecided “points of law.”127  Eventually, in 1810, the grouping of judges could decide on 
appellate cases, as well as choose a chief justice from among their midst.
128
  On January 5, 1819, 
the first court session of the official North Carolina State Supreme Court took place in Raleigh, 
and the court’s first chief justice was John Louis Taylor, William Gaston’s brother-in-law.129  
The state paid the justices a salary of $2,500, seven hundred dollars more than the superior court 
justices received.
130
  
The laws of slavery in North Carolina and the cases affected by them, the context in 
which the purely appellate North Carolina Supreme Court came into existence, and the 
seemingly minor detail of the sum the justices received is relevant to the discussion of State v. 
Will.  A presentation of the laws and cases is clearly necessary to understand the importance of 
State v. Will.  In comparison, a discussion of the state’s supreme court and the justices’ salary 
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may not seem pertinent.  These details do matter, however, in how they relate to the specific 
individuals who participated in State v. Will, in one capacity or another.  The details act as 
influencing factors for the participants who impacted the turn of events in the case.  The concept 
of southern honor, discussed next, is one such factor. 
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Chapter 2. Southern Men and Southern Honor 
 Many men, and even one woman, played an observable role in the events and outcome of 
State v. Will.  For this reason, descriptions of those involved will be included to provide a 
background for their actions, typically in light of the southern honor system.  The victim in the 
eyes of the law, Richard Baxter, is a key figure in the case, and so his role as overseer will be 
discussed.  The attorneys, both for the prosecution and for the defense, played a significant part 
in the outcome of the decision due to the persuasiveness (or lack thereof) found in their 
arguments.  They, too, require consideration.  Will’s owner, James S. Battle, likewise is an 
important figure in the incident.  He hired and generously paid the lawyers to defend his slave.  
The men who held the most direct power in the proceedings, the judges, perhaps had the most 
tangible effect on the case’s outcome.  Accordingly, Justices Ruffin and Gaston receive more 
discussion.  However other figures, such as Baxter’s unnamed wife and Allen, the slave foreman, 
also had an impact on the events that led to State v. Will.  Their actions and how they relate to the 
southern honor system is one such tool of analysis, because matters of respect and honor played 
an important – at times, subtle – role in the case of State v. Will.  Public opinion, respect, and 
honor influenced the actions of those in antebellum southern communities.  A person’s public 
opinion depended on his reputation, and a man could gain a good reputation if the community 
respected him.  However a man did not receive the community’s respect if he appeared 
dishonorable.  Historian Edward Ayers notes, “Honor and ‘public opinion’ came to seem 
synonymous.”131  As a result, the people and motivations that may or may not have influenced 
them can be discussed to provide a better context for an analysis of State v. Will.   
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 Richard Baxter’s actions on January 22, 1834 are vital to understanding State v. Will and 
its ramifications, however little information on the man himself is available.  His occupation as 
an overseer for James S. Battle is made clear in the court record.
132
  For that reason, information 
pertaining to overseers can be presented in an attempt to clarify his role and behavior.  His 
behavior, as recorded in the court document, was not flattering.  Historian John S. Bassett said 
that he “[was] a man whose temper differed materially from that of his pious namesake.”133  His 
namesake was that of a “Protestant adviser to the soul.”134  If he had aspired to follow that path, 
perhaps he could have assuaged his temper.  His impious behavior might be attributable, in part, 
to his job.  His actions might also be more understandable in light of the honor system. 
In The Plantation Overseer, John S. Bassett remarked that the overseer’s role “was 
central in the southern system,” and yet the necessity of his role did not translate into automatic 
respect.
 135
  Bassett said that overseers often had little respect from their employers, and even less 
respect from the slaves they supervised.
136
  Generally, men who became overseers did not 
receive much education.
137
  It was not necessary for them.  The characteristics that made 
overseers successful “were courage, industry, and common sense.”138  Such traits allowed 
overseers to keep “the institution of slavery [from going] to pieces under their supervision,” 
Bassett claimed.
139
  Planters hired overseers to keep their slaves and stock in a condition that 
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would allow them to exact as much labor and crops as possible, for as long as possible.
140
  They 
had to keep the slaves fed, working, and compliant.
141
  Due to the nature of their work, William 
Wiethoff states that “planters often treated overseers as subordinates.”142  As they were 
subordinates to the master, this treatment is not surprising.  Slaves’ perception of their overseer’s 
standing, on the other hand, is interesting.  Bassett wrote, “To the slaves he was ‘Buckra,’ a word 
expressing scorn for a man of no standing.”143  
 Slaves with some standing on the plantation – drivers or foremen – had the ability to 
influence the overseers’ actions and even act within a curtailed honor system.  Although 
subordinates of the overseers to whom they reported, slave foremen had influence in their role.  
Part of an overseer’s responsibility concerned the punishment of slaves when they had 
committed a wrong.
144
  Each day, the overseer checked periodically on the slaves’ labor and 
actions with the slave foreman who oversaw them.
145
  The opportunity to inform the overseer of 
a slave’s disobedience presented itself in such a scenario.  In the events that led to the State v. 
Will court case, the slave foreman, Allen, went directly to Richard Baxter after Will acted 
unfavorably towards Allen. Will’s behavior likely angered Allen and he might have believed that 
he needed to assert his authority over Will through Baxter.  Bertram Wyatt-Brown stated, “The 
subject of male slave identity and psychology involves issues of honor and shame not only in the 
presence of masters but also among the slaves themselves.”146  Although Ayers notes that “slaves 
had no honor,” they still operated within a society shaped by its customs, and responses to insults 
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varied from class to class.
147
  Allen’s decision to notify Baxter was the catalyst responsible for 
the events that followed and ended in Baxter’s death. 
Interestingly, the Battle family held Allen in high regard both before and after the 
altercation.  Kemp P. Battle, who later owned Allen through his marriage to James Battle’s 
daughter, said Allen “was a fine looking man, one-fourth white, [and was] as honest and 
honorable as ever lived and a very good farmer.”148  James Battle purchased Allen after the death 
of his previous master, Joel Battle, for $500 at auction in the midst “of financial depression.”149  
Others purchased the rest of Joel Battle’s male slaves for $300 each.150  Kemp Battle said Allen’s 
purchase shows “the estimation in which Allen was held by the neighborhood.”151  Another 
demonstration of the good opinion he harbored is how in The Battle Book, a comprehensive 
family genealogy published in 1930, Allen received his own section, with no reference to State v. 
Will.
152
  Instead, it noted his agricultural abilities and his respected personal attributes.  Allen 
stayed with the Battle family after State v. Will and the Civil War, until his death in 1876.
153
  At 
the time of his death, Allen held the role of overseer for Dr. and Mrs. Kemp P. Battle and owned 
close to $2,000 in assets.
154
  
  Clearly a cherished figure to the Battle family, Allen’s actions in the record of State v. 
Will are similarly important in what they revealed to the court.  After Allen discussed Will’s 
behavior with Baxter, Baxter decided to retrieve his gun before confronting him.  When he 
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entered his house, it was probably Allen who heard and later reported that Baxter’s wife said, “I 
would not my dear.”155  Baxter, perhaps in duty and more likely in anger, responded, “I will.”156  
In addition to the belief that Baxter’s actions were unnecessary, his wife’s comment could also 
indicate a societal value judgment.  Only men had honor in southern society, however women 
did participate as “audience and reward,” and Ayers states “no woman wanted to share in a 
dishonored name.”157  At the very least, the overheard conversation would become important in 
the trial.  In his opinion, Justice Gaston noted the wife’s comment and Baxter’s decision to take 
his gun to infer a violent intent of some kind. 
   Richard Baxter’s role as overseer and the actions he took to confront Will are important 
factors to consider for two reasons.  First, they influenced how the attorneys argued and what the 
North Carolina Supreme Court decided.  Second, they allow for a discussion of his actions in the 
context of the southern honor system.  Ariela Gross states that, “Historians have chronicled the 
many ways in which punishments went beyond what was ‘necessary’ to enforce obedience, in 
order to humiliate and dishonor the slave.”158  While Baxter’s motive for shooting Will was not 
likely punishment as much as it was retribution, the idea of honor – and dishonor – is relevant.  
In one of his descriptions of the events, George Gordon Battle said, “Will had an impediment in 
his speech which prevented him from talking when he was excited.  For this reason he did not 
answer the overseer, and thus produced the impression of sullenness and insubordination.”159  
Will’s impediment is not recorded in any official document.  In the court’s decision, Justice 
Gaston did acknowledge that “a complaint of some act of petulance and impropriety” against 
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Will caused Baxter to take action.
160
  While Will directed the “petulance and impropriety” 
toward Allen, Baxter responded as if he had been disrespected.  Both versions support an 
interpretation of how the events of State v. Will connect to Edward Ayers’s general comment on 
the importance of respect and honor, and how “when that respect was not forthcoming between 
men, violence might be the result.”161  In confrontations between overseers and slaves that did 
not reach the court, the master acted as arbiter over the conflicts. 
Masters did not always agree with the extent of the overseers’ violent actions.162  In 1824, 
a planter from South Carolina said, “I put overseers on my plantations to protect my negroes, not 
to kill them.”163  A fellow South Carolinian’s contract with overseers contained the rule that, 
“The proprietor is always ready to excuse such errors as may proceed from want of judgment; 
but he never can or will excuse any cruelty, severity, or want of care towards the negroes.”164  It 
is an understandable rule.  Masters would not want irreparable damage to come toward their 
slaves, at the very least, for economic reasons.  Ariela Gross provides another reason.  She says, 
“Buyers, sellers, hirers, owners, and overseers all told different stories about why slaves behaved 
as they did, all of which reflected on their masters’ character.”165  Character and honor were 
intertwined in the southern honor system.
166
  While referring to overseers’ necessary correction 
of slaves and how it should be implemented, P.C. Weston, Esq. of South Carolina wrote in an 
1857 issue of Debow’s Review how “abusive language or violence of demeanor should be 
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avoided: they reduce the man who uses them to a level with the negro.”167  William Wiethoff 
writes, “Some planters appeared to tolerate pragmatically the moral stain they sometimes 
suffered when their overseers brutalized slaves.”168  James S. Battle does not appear to be one of 
them. 
From family records and available information, James Battle seems to be an honorable 
man.  In his discussion of State v. Will, John Bassett commented that “feelings of humanity and 
honor… have usually characterized members of the family which Will was the property.”169  
When James Battle died in 1854, he owned “several hundred slaves” and close to twenty 
thousand acres of land.
170
  George Gordon Battle painted a romantic picture of life on Battle’s 
plantation: “on a plantation such as that of my grandfather undoubtedly the conditions were as 
favorable as possible.  The slaves were well and humanely treated.  They lived comfortably and 
were by universal report happy and contented.”171  George Gordon Battle’s rosy perspective may 
be founded in truth. 
Kemp Battle recalled an interesting story about James Battle’s treatment of slaves, 
supposedly recounted by a slave named Dick.  According to the account, James Battle informed 
Dick that the owner of Dick’s wife decided to move to Mississippi.  Battle offered to purchase 
her, however the owner declined.  Battle then asked the man if he would purchase Dick, to which 
he agreed.  Battle told Dick what had happened and said it was Dick’s decision whether he 
would stay with Battle or be sold to his wife’s owner and accompany her to Mississippi.  The 
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next day, Dick answered Battle, “Well, Marster, I ‘clude dat I’ll never git as good a marster as 
you is, but I kin git as good a wife as I got now.”172  It is likely that Battle’s other slaves 
considered him to be a good master as well.  Rather than attempt to run away, Will went to 
Battle the very same day of his altercation with Baxter.  While he did not know that Baxter had 
died, it is not likely that a slave would have sought out his master if he thought a cruel response 
awaited him.   
Battle’s response to the events that transpired between Baxter and Will was to defend his 
slave, for which he paid a fee of $1,000.
173
  Battle could have had several reasons for defending 
Will.  One possible reason is very simple: he did not want to lose his investment.  Financial 
reasons alone do not explain his decision, though.  The amount he paid the attorneys was quite 
substantial.  To put it into perspective, the attorneys’ fees equaled forty percent of the justices’ 
annual salaries.
174
  If finances were Battle’s only concern, he would have spent less money and 
purchased another slave to replace Will. 
Duty and honor, then, were probably the reasons for Battle’s actions.  Masters had a duty 
to protect their slaves from harm.  In reference to interference from strangers, Justice Charles 
Colcock of South Carolina, as quoted by Joseph H. Schauinger, said, “It is the duty as well as the 
interest of every master to protect his slave from unnecessary punishment and to resist the abuse 
of legal authority.”175  Bertram Wyatt-Brown noted that owners sometimes supported their slaves 
because they did not want outside interference.  “After all,” he wrote, “a man’s honor was 
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compromised when outsiders questioned his style of business.”176  Ariela Gross comments on 
how cases involving slaves “mattered to white southerners because their self-understandings as 
white masters depended on their relationships to black slaves; putting black character on trial 
called white character into question as well.”177 
James Battle hired George Washington Mordecai and Bartholomew Figures Moore to 
defend Will and perhaps his own honor.  Both men were in their early thirties when they argued 
the case before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
178
  Mordecai had studied law under his older 
brother and finished his lessons at age nineteen, however he did not receive his law license until 
he turned twenty-one.  During the time he represented Will, Mordecai operated a dry goods store 
with another brother and he would pursue several business ventures throughout his life.
 179
  For 
Moore, his involvement in State v. Will ignited his legal career.
180
  He began his political career 
two years after the case as a member of the House of Commons in North Carolina in 1836, and 
later became North Carolina’s Attorney General in 1848.181  A monument of Moore in North 
Carolina had an inscription that read, in part, “To evade a duty was to him impossible.”182  His 
daughter L.C. Capehart recounted one of his slave’s reactions to the monument.  Sukey 
reportedly said, “It’s mity like marster, all but one thing; it ain’t go no arms. Marster was such a 
busy man, always at work, it ought to have arms put to it.”183  In an address to the Dialectic and 
Philanthropic Societies of the University of North Carolina in 1846, Moore said, “It is an error to 
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suppose that we may avoid our share of responsibility by surrendering it to others.” 184  Whether 
Moore considered State v. Will purely a professional responsibility or a responsibility to 
mankind, his work furthered justice for slaves within the confines of the institution of slavery.  
On the topic of justice, Moore stated in his address that, “The idea of justice is not innate, and to 
possess a proper sense of it, is more difficult than the acquisition of any other virtue.”185   
Justice is a relative concept.  The attorney for the prosecution, Attorney General John 
Reeves Jones Daniel, may have very well believed his position in State v. Will was just.  He “had 
a reputation as a brilliant lawyer and an able speaker,” according to a biographical account.186  
Kemp Battle wrote that Daniel “ably opposed B.F. Moore” in State v. Will.187  His favorable 
traits that aided him in his career were said to be a “clear and discriminating mind, patient 
industry, and high integrity.”188  The judge in the original trial was another respected figure.  A 
man named Stephen F. Miller wrote that Judge John Robert Donnell “was a quiet, unobtrusive, 
upright gentleman . . . His life was exemplary, and his abilities and integrity as a Judge secured 
him a spotless reputation.”189  At age seventeen, Donnell lived in New Bern in order to study law 
under none other than William Gaston.
190
  Politics consumed Gaston’s time at that stage, 
however, and so he did not spend a lot of time with Donnell.
 191
  It is an interesting thought that, 
perhaps, if Donnell had received more tutelage and shaping from Gaston, State v. Will may not 
have reached North Carolina’s Supreme Court. 
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Of course, the North Carolina Supreme Court did review State v. Will and issue a 
decision in December of 1834.  The three justices on the court at the time were Joseph John 
Daniel, Thomas Ruffin, and William Gaston.  Kemp Battle wrote, “I do not believe that either 
England or America ever had a stronger court.”192  In 1832, Joseph J. Daniel became a justice on 
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
193
  Many people wanted William Gaston to accept a 
nomination to the bench at that time, but he refused.
194
  At the same time, he did not want Daniel 
to become a justice.  Joseph H. Schauinger wrote, “Gaston felt that Daniel was entirely 
unqualified for the station, telling his daughter that he had formed this opinion not on prejudice 
but through sober judgment.”195  When Daniel won the election and Gaston heard, he “groaned, 
‘My country, O my country.’”196  Perhaps Daniel exceeded Gaston’s expectations.  Kemp Battle 
believed, “[Daniel’s] opinions were strong and clear … but he made no effort to… gain 
reputation by rhetorical effort.”197   
Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court was in jeopardy in the early 1830’s.198  
Disapproval existed, Schauinger wrote, “because of the tardiness with which business was done, 
its concealment of opinions until moment of adjournment, and its haste in drafting opinions.”199  
When Chief Justice Leonard Henderson died in 1833, men ranging from Governor Swain of 
North Carolina to Justice Thomas Ruffin “besieged” Gaston “‘to save the court’” and accept a 
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nomination.
200
  Ruffin went so far as to tell Gaston that if he could not join the supreme court, 
Ruffin would resign and the court would no longer exist.
201
 
There were two major barriers Gaston had to overcome before he could accept the 
nomination.  One barrier was debt in the amount of $8,000.
202
  Schauinger reported that “by 
accepting the proffered position he was giving up an income of $6,000 for $2,500.”203  A new 
payment plan allowed Gaston to repay his debt in four or five years, in yearly installments.
204
  
The other hurdle was a law meant to prevent Catholics from obtaining state office.
205
  Gaston, a 
devout Catholic, did not know if he could legally assume office.  In a letter to Ruffin, Gaston 
wrote, “I had sworn to support that Constitution, and it seemed safer in conscience to remain 
always a private citizen, than to run the risque [sic] of breaking that oath by accepting an office 
from which perhaps that Constitution excluded me.”206  After much contemplation and 
discussions with men such as Ruffin, Gaston concluded, “that whatever views some of the 
framers of the Constitution may have entertained this disqualification is not plainly expressed in 
it – can not judicially be inferred from it – and must therefore be regarded as not contained in 
it.”207  With the major obstacles cleared from his path, William Gaston accepted the nomination 
and won the election with 59.89% of the overall vote and 72.72% of named votes.
208
  He became 
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a justice on the Supreme Court of North Carolina on November 27, 1833, shortly before he 
would write the opinion for State v. Will.
209
   
The man who urged Gaston to join him on the court, Thomas Ruffin, had been a justice 
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina since 1829.
210
  Because the death of Leonard Henderson 
in 1833 left the position of chief justice empty, Justices Ruffin, Gaston and Daniel had to fill the 
role when they met for the first session.  Justice Daniel informed the men he did not want to be 
chief justice, which resulted in Ruffin and Gaston “[settling] the matter by lot,” and Ruffin 
becoming chief justice.
211
  Throughout his time on the court between 1829 and 1852, with a brief 
reprisal in 1858 to 1859, Ruffin’s reputation grew strong.212  Kemp Battle wrote, “Chief Justice 
Thomas Ruffin was considered one of the most learned lawyers in the land.  His opinions were 
quoted with praise by the highest courts in the country and even in England.” 213  The editors’ 
preface to Mark Tushnet’s Slave Law in the American South supports Battle’s statement with the 
contention that Ruffin was “one of the foremost southern jurists of his day.”214 
Justice Ruffin’s opinion in the 1829 case State v. Mann gained him notoriety.  He 
reversed a trial court’s judgment that found John Mann guilty of the battery of a slave he had 
hired.  Ruffin disagreed with the trial judge who instructed the jury that Mann only had a 
“special property” of the slave as a hirer.215  He believed Mann had the same rights as the owner 
of the slave during the contracted time.  Furthermore, Ruffin ruled that owners could not be held 
criminally liable for batteries upon their slaves.  Masters had unlimited power over their slaves in 
                                                 
209
 Schauinger, William Gaston, 162. 
210
 Clark, “Slave cases,” 4. 
211
 Schauinger, William Gaston, 162. 
212
 Clark, “Slave cases,” 4.   
213
 Battle, Memories, 100. 
214
 Mark V. Tushnet, Slave Law in the American South (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003), x. 
215
 State v. John Mann, 13 N.C. 263; 1829 N.C. LEXIS 62. 
43 
 
North Carolina, except where statutes said otherwise.  According to North Carolina law, they 
could not kill their slaves outside of “moderate correction.”216  Mann did not kill Lydia, and 
according to the court, he had the same authority of owner at the time he shot her.  Therefore, he 
could not be indicted for battery, either, said Ruffin.  Ruffin predicated his ruling “upon the 
ground, that this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the 
master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their subordination.”217 
The legacy of Justice Ruffin differed from that of Justice Gaston.  Both men’s legal 
abilities have received acclaim, however their approaches varied.  Historian E.J. Clark writes, 
“Ruffin was consistently strict in his interpretation and application of the law.”218  In the cases 
presented to Ruffin, he deemed it important to consider the effect they would have.  “The rule 
the court adopted, not… individualized justice” concerned him, according to Tushnet.219  Had 
Ruffin ruled to uphold the jury’s decision in State v. Mann, Sally Greene says it “would have 
involved an acknowledgement, at least at some level, of the rights of a wounded slave.”220  
Robert M. Cover, on the other hand, said William Gaston “would author some of the most 
eloquent of the liberal opinions of slavery, relying heavily on ‘humanity’ and natural right.”221  
Five years after State v. Mann, Gaston penned the decision in State v. Will, what Schauinger 
called his “most famous decision . . . [which] became a landmark in a more liberal and humane 
attitude.”222 
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Judges such as Ruffin and Gaston, along with others in the legal community, were well 
respected in southern society.  Upon deciding to assume office, Gaston wrote to Ruffin, “There is 
no civil office which man can hold of which I think more respectfully than of that of a Judge.”223  
Bertram Wyatt-Brown agreed in Southern Honor.  He noted that “judges usually enjoyed the 
highest respect,” and that they, along with the lawyers, “were the intelligentsia of community 
life, especially in the more isolated, rural settings.”224  When Gaston guided the effort to create 
the purely appellate North Carolina Supreme Court in 1818, he included in his bill to the House 
of Commons that it “must have men of ability and integrity in order to obtain respect.”225  
Edward Ayers states, “It is significant that lawyers made up a large portion of state legislators 
and won great wealth and respect through their profession.”226 
The people involved in State v. Will ranged in status, and yet they all had a crucial role in 
the outcome of the case.  The roles varied from slave foreman to justices of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court.  Ayers remarks that “honor did not reside only within the South’s planter class,” 
however the most influential men in the State v. Will court case were either lawyers or judges.
227
  
As “keepers of tradition,” it is clear that they recognized honor’s impact in their day-to-day lives 
and in the community.
228
  Likewise, honor had a role in State v. Will.  Wyatt-Brown believed, 
“Whatever the outcome might be in any particular case, the moral focus was honor.”229  James 
Battle might have paid a high fee to the attorneys to defend his own honor while the jury and 
justices may have considered Richard Baxter’s actions against Will dishonorable.  In the South, 
whites believed that “to allow the ultimate inferior, a slave, to ruffle one’s calm would be 
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dishonorable,” according to Gross.230  Baxter’s actions, as reported in the court record, certainly 
indicate a lack of composure.   
Because of the importance it held in southern society, the arguments the attorneys made 
and the decision Justice Gaston wrote in State v. Will should be understood within the context of 
the honor system.  Perhaps more important to understanding the actual case is the tension 
between the roles of slaves as “persons” and “property.”231  Because while “both law and honor 
culture found the moral agency of slaves threatening,” Ariela Gross states “it was in the legal 
arena that white men were forced to confront the contradictions such agency raised.”232 
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Chapter 3. The Attorneys’ Arguments and the Judge’s Justice 
 The fatal incident that transpired on January 22, 1834 on a plantation in Edgecombe 
County, North Carolina created an avenue for progress in North Carolina slave justice – a justice 
bound by the needs of its slave society.  Ultimately, the case concerned how much of the slaves’ 
humanity would be accepted in light of its society’s desire to maintain the existing social order.  
According to the prosecution, masters’ discretion and slaves’ submission were at stake.  Relying 
on slaves’ status as property, Attorney General Daniel believed they were usually willing to 
accept “the severest chastisement” without “[feelings of] degradation or sentiment of indignity 
common to the breast of the white man.”  The defense conceded that slaves’ “passions are not 
subject to be aroused by the same causes and circumstances, which would arouse those of a 
freeman.”  However, George W. Mordecai asked the court while appealing for Will, “Should not 
the same allowance be made for the infirmity of his nature, the operation of his passions, the 
excitement of his feelings, that is made in the case of a white man?”  In State v. Will, the 
attorneys and justices had to contend with the dual roles slaves occupied in their slave society.  
After consideration of slaves’ personhood and property status, along with the legal precedents, 
Justice William Gaston wrote an opinion for the North Carolina Supreme Court that 
acknowledged that slave passion could be recognized as a mitigation for crime.  The decision 
stated that if a slave killed his master in self-defense, the slave had committed manslaughter 
rather than murder.  State v. Will had the effect of granting slaves in North Carolina more 
protection within the institution of slavery, as evidenced by later supreme court cases.
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 Will’s owner hired Bartholomew F. Moore and George W. Mordecai to defend Will 
against the murder charge.  Moore began his defense with the acceptance that, although Baxter 
was an overseer, he had the same authority of master over Will.  His reasoning came from State 
v. Mann, when Justice Ruffin said, “Our laws uniformly treat the master or other person having 
the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the same extent of authority.”234  Given 
Baxter’s master-equivalent status, Moore stated that if Will had died when Baxter shot him, 
Baxter would have been guilty of murder himself.  He told the court that Baxter’s actions before 
the altercation indicated deliberation and “intent to shoot the prisoner.”  When Allen went to 
Baxter’s house, Baxter made sure to grab his loaded shotgun and he told Allen to follow at a 
distance.  Had the intention of bringing the gun been for defense, Moore said, he would have 
kept Allen with him as support.  Moore believed Baxter decided he would shoot Will before he 
ever reached the cotton screw.  He argued, “[Baxter] was not surprised into the act of shooting; it 
was expected and intended beforehand, and therefore murderous.”235   
 To reach a satisfactory result for his client, Moore had to convince the justices to accept 
Will’s human response to the man who had the authority of master – and property owner – over 
him.  Consequently, Moore delved into masters’ authority and slaves’ submission in light of 
State v. Mann.  He noted how that decision left a master’s power over his slave principally 
unchallenged if the slave should survive a violent incident.  Moore told the court, including 
Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin who wrote the opinion in State v. Mann, that he did not believe it 
meant, “In declaring that a master cannot be indicted for a battery on his slave… that [a master] 
cannot be indicted for any offence which necessarily includes a battery.”  The decision, Moore 
believed, was “never intended to cover the entire relation between master and slave.”  If that had 
                                                 
234
 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263; 1829 N.C. LEXIS 62; Devereux's Ct. Cl. 263. 
235
Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases, 164, 125. 
48 
 
been the court’s intention five years earlier in State v. Mann, Moore claimed the decision was 
“starting and abhorrent to humanity . . . [and] at variance with statute law and decided cases.”236 
Masters did not have complete uncontrolled discretion in how to treat slaves.  In addition 
to laws that punished the murder of slaves, masters had to face “the irresistible force of public 
sentiment,” which Ruffin had also mentioned in State v. Mann.  Moore posed to the court that, 
“If that force is now setting in a counter-current against the license of absolute power, either it is 
to be deprecated and stopped, or absolute power is most clearly proved to be unnecessary to the 
ends of slavery.”  The rejection of providing masters with absolute power was evident in acts the 
North Carolina legislature passed and public opinion, as stated by Moore.  He went on to say, 
“The Courts of the country should foster the enlightened benevolence of the age.”  Moore 
appealed to the white men’s “benevolence” before he asked them to consider slaves’ humanity.   
He had the difficult task of balancing a master’s superior role with a slave’s human response.237    
In State v. Mann, Ruffin wrote that slaves must believe that their masters are the ultimate 
authority in order “to remain a slave.”  Moore believed the implication of that belief “denies to 
the slave the smallest attribute of a rational or feeling creature.”  To have completely mindless 
slaves, an insurmountable task in and of itself, would actually have adverse consequences.   
Moore told the court, “If the relation [between slave and master] require that the slave should be 
disrobed of the essential features which distinguish him from the brute, the relation must adapt 
itself to the consequences, and leave its subject the instinctive privileges of a brute.”  It would 
not be in a master’s best interest to have such a slave.  Allowances must be granted, Moore 
stated, because “any attempt to restrain or punish a slave for the exercise of a right, which even 
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absolute power cannot destroy, is inhuman, and without the slightest benefit to the security of the 
master, or that of society at large.”238 
Moore knew how North Carolina society functioned and the importance of slavery to its 
powerful citizens.  His argument called attention to how his client’s case, and those like it, could 
threaten what many southerners held dear if allowances were not made.  In a situation of self-
defense, “punishment will be powerless to reclaim, or to warn by example.  It can serve no 
purpose but to gratify the revengeful feelings of one class of people, and to inflame the hidden 
animosities of the other.”  Moore could have purposely brought to mind events such as the Nat 
Turner rebellion that happened only a few years prior to State v. Will with that statement.  If it 
was not his intent, it is likely that the justices thought of it anyway.  With or without examples of 
slave uprising in mind, Moore reiterated that “punishment short of death serves the end of the 
master, both as a corrective and as an example.”239 
The courts should take instances of masters who extended their punishment to result in a 
slave’s death very seriously, Moore believed.  “The examination should be rigorous, for it is the 
only protection which the slave can claim at the hands of the law, and therefore ought to be strict, 
in order to be the more efficient.”  Ironically, in their death, slaves could receive more legal 
acceptance of their humanity than ever before.  Moore pointed out to the court, “It is here alone 
that the slave, in the eye of the law, ascends from the level of mere property, and takes an 
humble stand amid his species.  Here he is regarded as a rational creature.”  Moore wanted his 
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audience to consider the treatment Will received and his subsequent actions in light of his 
humanity.
240
 
 In State v. Will, Moore highlighted Baxter’s unlawful actions and explained how they 
caused a natural, human response in his client.  Baxter should not have shot Will, Moore argued, 
because even law enforcement could not kill an escaping criminal without repercussions.  He 
contended that, “No one will be found to maintain that it is the duty of the master to kill his slave 
rather than suffer his temporary escape.  The prisoner was in the act of disobedience, and not of 
resistance, between which there is a substantial difference.”  Had Will resisted Baxter, the man 
could have legally used force to punish him.  Simple disobedience did not allow for a lethal 
punishment, and Will’s initial attempt to run away did not give Baxter the right to shoot him.  
Therefore, Moore asked the court a question central to the case: “Was the prisoner justly so 
provoked by the shooting, as under the influence of ordinary human frailty, to cause his reason to 
be dethroned, and to be deprived of deliberation?”241 
The answer to Moore’s question would have an impact in determining whether Will had 
committed murder or manslaughter.  As a capable attorney, Moore answered the question in his 
client’s favor.  “An appeal to human nature in its most degraded state, will answer, 
unhesitatingly, it was,” he told the court.  To answer the question in the negative would mean 
Will’s actions “may be murder; but if so, it must find its guilt, not in the human disposition, but 
in a policy that knows no frailty and shows no mercy.”  Will’s attorneys denied that Will’s 
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actions had been deliberate because he had been provoked.  If his actions were not deliberate, he 
had not committed murder.
242
 
Slaves were not provoked to the same extent that white men were, but as humans they 
still experienced emotions such as surprise and fear.  “When a slave is required to bare his back 
to the rod, he does it, because it is usual,” Moore told the court.  However he reasoned that slaves 
would not – and could not – accept any and all treatment from their masters.  “When he is 
required to stand as a target for his master’s gun, he is startled: no idea of duty sustains the 
requirement, and the unquelled portion of his instinct rouses his passions to resistance.”  The law 
and precedent supported Moore in his assertion that slaves were “reasonable or human 
creature[s].”  Moore referenced State v. Scott, State v. Hale, and State v. Reed to show that the 
law “would seem to result, that [a slave] was acknowledged to possess the human infirmities 
common to his species.”  The cases illustrated how slaves could commit crimes and have crimes 
committed against them, and how the law took action against them and for them.  Slaves were 
not brainless brutes, and while they could not always respond in the same way a white man 
would, they could not be denied “from feeling and pleading a legal provocation” in every 
instance.
243
 
Moore thought the only unsettled question was whether the time between when Baxter 
shot Will and when he received his fatal wound indicated that Will acted out of passion.  Will 
slashed Baxter six to eight minutes after Baxter shot him, however he spent the intermediate time 
in pursuit from Baxter and fellow slaves.  Moore said, “The law would be vain and nugatory as a 
rule of action, if it should allow that the passions may be justly provoked, and yet refuse to allow 
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a reasonable time for their subsidence.”  The circumstances of each case should be considered to 
determine whether provocation had factored into someone’s action, he believed.  The more 
serious the wound received, the more time the individual should be granted to have recovered his 
faculties.  Moore argued that Will could not have regained his senses in such a short period of 
time.  Will, he said, believed his injury to be fatal, and ran from the man who had delivered the 
wound.  In addition, three slaves pursued Will, per Baxter’s order.  Moore told the court that 
Baxter “was well aware of the mangled condition of his victim, and who, under the full 
conviction of his shot proving fatal, cheered his comrades of the chase by the unfeeling 
exclamation, ‘he can't run far.’”244 
 Given the circumstances, attorney Bartholomew Moore maintained that his client had 
only committed manslaughter.  Will did not initiate the violent altercation and he tried to avoid 
the aftermath.  Moore said, “In no part of the slave’s conduct does he evince a disposition to seek 
a conflict.  He takes every occasion to avoid it.”  Here, Moore perhaps tried to calm concerns of 
slaves acting out in response to a master’s discipline.  He even conceded Will’s disobedience and 
how he ran to evade punishment.  As Will had obeyed Baxter’s demand to come down from the 
cotton screw, he must have referred to the earlier incident between Will and Allen.  Moore did 
not dispute that Will had killed Baxter, either.  However, he said “the tamest and most domestic 
brute will do likewise” if they “[had] been dangerously shot, pursued, and overtaken.”245 
 Moore emphasized the importance of the court’s decision, a concern of which the justices 
were likely very aware.  The extent of a master’s authority over his slave had to be determined, 
for society’s sake.  “No question can be more delicate, or attended with so many bad 
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consequences if settled in error,” he told them.  The North Carolina Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to influence public opinion and create a settled principle.  Moore reminded the court 
of some of its previous decisions that indicated “the progression of humanity… and their clear 
conviction, that the condition of the slave was rapidly advancing in amelioration, under the 
benign influence of Christian precepts and the benevolent auspices of improving civilization.”  
His statement signified the importance of the justices’ decision, while at the same time trying to 
minimize the controversial aspects of it.  By remarking on the gradual progress that had taken 
place, Moore wanted the court to realize that it would be in line with accepted ideas in society.
246
 
The North Carolina legislature had been a part of the gradual change.  Over time, it had 
passed laws and made improvements in acceptable treatment of slaves.  It did so despite events 
such as Nat Turner’s Rebellion and other incidents throughout the South which caused concern 
for the institution of slavery.  Moore reminded the court that the legislature continued to uphold 
progress in slave treatment “at a time when the public mind was inflamed and alarmed at a recent 
and yet reeking massacre.”  The direction the law continued to go in was one of “raising the 
slave higher and higher in the scale of moral being,” he said.  Moore believed the court had to 
consider the “enlightened sentiment of the State.”  He suggested to not do so would be 
unreasonable.  He asked, “Will [the court] rebuke the spirit of the age, and strike back this 
unfortunate race of men, advancing from the depths of misery and wretchedness, to a higher 
ground, under the shield of so much legislation enacted in their behalf?”247 
Moore ended his argument powerfully by referencing an idea Justice Ruffin posed in 
State v. Mann, along with Northern zeal.  Moore commented, “I know it is has been frequently 
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said, and with some it is a favorite idea, that the more cruel the master, the more subservient will 
be the slave.”248  It is likely that Moore meant his comment to address Thomas Ruffin’s 
statement in State v. Mann, that “The power of the master must be absolute, to render the 
submission of the slave perfect.”249  While Ruffin himself acknowledged the severity of it, 
Moore said “this precept is abhorrent to humanity, and is a heresy unsupported by the great mass 
of historic experience.”  If North Carolina allowed masters to shoot their slaves, Moore did not 
believe it would create perfect submission.  Rather, it would “produce open conflicts or secret 
assassinations.”  Slaves’ submission was very important to southern society, and he did not 
believe granting slaves more humanity would damage it.  Moore warned that the court could not 
escape this reality, and that it “must pass through Scylla and Charybdis.”  If the South tried to 
avoid “the whirlpool of Northern fanaticism” by not accepting slaves’ humanity, it would ignore 
“that of the South[, which] is equally fatal.”  Moore cautioned that southern fanaticism “may not 
be so visibly seen; but it is as deep, as wide, and as dangerous.”  To decide in Will’s favor would 
not damage the institution of slavery, he implied.  It would preserve it.
250
 
In the court records, attorney George W. Mordecai followed Moore’s poignant argument 
to further discuss slaves’ humanity and its acceptance in North Carolina law.  He provided the 
court with a brief history of the state’s legislative actions.  “Slaves seem formerly to have been 
regarded in this State as mere chattels,” he began.  Their importance rested in their worth as 
property, and not as human beings.  Mordecai went on to show how, in 1834, the law considered 
a slave to be more than a possession.  He reminded the court of the acts of 1774, 1791, and 1817, 
all of which concerned the killing of slaves.  The acts increased the punishment of killing a slave, 
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and by 1817 “placed the killing of a slave, on the same footing, under like circumstances, with 
the killing of a free man.”  The gradual progress in North Carolina law pointed to an increasing 
acknowledgment and acceptance that slaves were human beings.  After all, a person would not 
be charged with the murder of “mere chattel.”  The North Carolina Supreme Court itself had 
aided in the progress, as well.  For example, in State v. Hale, the court determined that a free 
man could be charged with the battery of a slave.  “These various acts[,] both legislative and 
judicial,” Mordecai asserted, indicated that “slaves are no longer regarded as mere brutes or 
chattels, but that they are now viewed both in the eye of the law and of society, as human beings, 
liable to be operated upon by the same passions… and under the protection of the same laws 
with the white man.”  Therefore, slaves’ personhood and accompanying passion in moments 
such as the altercation between Will and Baxter should be accepted.
251
 
Mordecai anticipated the distinction between slave and freeman, and their varied 
conditioned responses.  He admitted that the same actions which would incite a freeman should 
not incite a slave.  Still, he believed to deny the slave his passion in a moment of great injury 
would be unreasonable.  In an almost chastising comment, Mordecai proclaimed, “All law 
should be founded on reason; and when we are led to a conclusion to utterly absurd, and so 
manifestly contradictory to reason, it is time that we should look around, and at least suspect that 
we have mistaken the meaning of a law, which leads us to such results.”  He proceeded to temper 
his oratory with more concessions, chiefly that it is “not necessary… that the slave should be 
placed on the same footing with the freeman.”252 
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Mordecai believed a legal middle-ground existed, and that it applied to his client’s case.  
He said what would be considered justifiable homicide for a freeman should be considered 
manslaughter – not murder – for a slave.  It would be in everyone’s best interest.  He noted there 
would be “a sufficiently broad and marked distinction… between the two classes, to secure the 
dominion of one, and the subserviency of the other, and at the same time to afford the slave all 
necessary protection against acts of lawless violence and outrage.”253 
Bartholomew Moore had already addressed State v. Mann, however George Mordecai 
attempted to weaken the claim that State v. Mann absolved Baxter.  The contention that, as a 
master-equivalent, “the exercise of that authority cannot be called in question by any earthly 
tribunal,” did not reflect reality, Mordecai claimed.  State v. Mann only addressed masters who 
committed battery on their slaves.  It also qualified a master’s power “so far as its exercise is 
forbidden by statute,” and murdering slaves was against the law.  Masters could and had been 
indicted for the murder of their slaves.  Mordecai opined to the court that “the master or person 
representing him has no right to resort to means, or to use weapons, likely to produce death, and 
the very moment he does so, he is guilty of an abuse of his power.”  Baxter shot Will, and if it 
had been fatal, Baxter could have been held guilty of murder.  The injured slave simply 
“[obeyed] the impulse of nature” by acting in “self-preservation.”  While reasonable and 
gracious to slaves’ instincts, the problem with Mordecai’s argument is that it was hypothetical 
because Will did not die.  This crucial fact would be expounded upon by the prosecution in an 
attempt to seal Will’s fate.254  
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Attorney General J.R.J. Daniel represented the state in the case, and he certainly tried to 
counter the defense’s arguments to prove that Will had committed murder.  From the very 
beginning, he wanted to show the extent of a master’s power over his slave.  Daniel agreed that a 
master could not murder his slave and emphasized how that was the master’s only restriction.   
He laid the foundation for his argument with a history of global and domestic slavery.  He noted 
the existence of slavery in countries such as Israel, Egypt, Greece and Rome, as well as the first 
slaves to arrive in Virginia in 1620.  “From the origin of slavery, it was probably absolute when 
first introduced,” he told the court.  And yet in light of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s prior 
decisions and the state’s legislative actions, he acknowledged that absolute slavery did not exist 
in 1834 North Carolina.  Just as Will’s defense attorneys had, Daniel discussed the acts of 1774, 
1779, and 1817 with the court.  Daniel said that before the state passed those acts, killing a slave 
was not a felony, and “if the view which I have presented be correct, the authority of the master 
is uncontrolled, except by the act of 1817.”  Echoing a remark Thomas Ruffin made in State v. 
Mann, Daniel admitted the severity of his claim.
255
  
With the restriction set forth in State v. Mann as his guide, Daniel did not believe 
Baxter’s actions mitigated Will’s response.  For Will’s crime to have been manslaughter and not 
murder, Will had to have been legally provoked.  Daniel did not believe the wound Will received 
or his subsequent flight and capture amounted to legal provocation.  He declared to the court, “If 
the master’s authority be what I contend it is, and the case of the State v. Mann has any 
foundation in law, the conduct of the deceased towards the prisoner was in nowise forbidden by 
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law, and could not[,] therefore, constitute a legal provocation, to extenuate the homicide to 
manslaughter.”256   
Daniel used Will’s status as property to explain why he should have remained submissive 
after being shot, and what could happen if the court granted him an extenuation.  “The truth,” 
Daniel held, “is the slave [is taught] to believe that he is the property of his master, and that 
submission to his will is commendable.”  In other words, slaves had a higher level of tolerance, 
and to lower it would harm society.  Baxter had not even committed a crime, according to State 
v. Mann, because Will did not die.  Daniel suggested for the court to rule in Will’s favor would 
put further restraints on a master’s power, and the results would not be favorable for southern 
society.  If slaves had more legal power to react when a master punished him “with any weapon 
calculated to produce death, be it a gun, rod, or cane, [the slave] may wreak his vengeance 
without incurring the punishment of death[.]  What will be its tendency?” Daniel asked.  He 
countered one of Moore’s previous arguments and said such “humane and benevolent work of 
advancing [slaves] in the scale of moral beings” could actually be disastrous for the institution of 
slavery.  Perhaps in an attempt to prey upon the justices’ fears as slave owners and the relatively 
recent episodes of slave rebellion, Daniel warned their decision could “increase the importance 
of the slave, and beget a spirit of insubordination.”  Eventually, he believed, “nothing short of 
absolute emancipation would satisfy” them.  Daniel explicitly aligned the justices’ decision with 
the strengthening or weakening of slavery.
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The justices of the North Carolina State Supreme Court had to contend with many issues 
as they reached their decision, among them public opinion, legal precedents, and slaves’ 
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personhood.  The North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately decided, unanimously, that Will 
committed manslaughter and not murder.  The difference between the two charges amounted to 
whether Will committed the crime “with malice aforethought.”  Justice William Gaston wrote 
the opinion for the court, and he opened with Will’s charges and a brief description of the events 
that resulted in Baxter’s death.  “Had this unfortunate affair occurred between two freemen, 
whatever might have been their relative condition, the homicide could not have been more than 
manslaughter,” Gaston decided.  Will, of course, was not a freeman or simply an apprentice.  As 
a slave, Will owed his master submission.  Not in all cases, however.  Just as a master had 
absolute power with the exception of killing his slave, Gaston wrote, “I hold it to be equally 
certain that the slave has a right to defend himself against the unlawful attempt of his master to 
deprive him of life.”258  
The important question, then, was whether Baxter’s actions were unlawful.  The justices 
all agreed that Baxter had the authority to confront Will and punish him for his disobedience.  As 
he approached Will, Baxter acted “within the limits of his rightful authority.”  Will’s attempt to 
evade punishment deserved punishment, as well.  “This act, however, was not resistance nor 
rebellion, and it certainly afforded no justification nor excuse for the barbarous act which 
followed,” Gaston wrote.  If Will had died as a result of the shooting, Gaston believed Baxter 
“would have been guilty of manslaughter at least – probably of murder.”  Baxter’s actions had a 
“character of cruelty… and it was too probable that [the act] had been deliberately contemplated 
and eventually resolved on, before the attempt to escape.”259   
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In light of Baxter’s misdeeds, the court had to ascertain whether Will responded in a 
legally acceptable manner.  Gaston believed it important to remind readers “that passion, 
however excited, is not set up as a legal defence, or excuse for a criminal act.”  Legal 
provocation could mitigate a crime, though.  As a slave, the potential mitigation was limited and 
at question.  For this reason, Will’s attorneys did not argue justifiable homicide on his behalf, 
only manslaughter.  Gaston found that in Will’s case, “it became instinct, almost uncontrollable 
instinct, to fly; it was human infirmity to struggle; it was terror or resentment, the strongest of 
human passions, or both combined, which gave the struggle its fatal result.”  The problem 
remained, however, that Will did not die from his wounds and Baxter did.  Adhering to State v. 
Mann, Gaston wrote, “Had the overseer lived he could not have been indicted for the deed; for 
however criminal his intent, the criminal act was not consummated.”  He then posed a question: 
did that fact preclude his action from being “termed as legal provocation?”  The answer was no.  
Gaston used the example of adultery, for which people could not be criminally charged, while at 
the same time could “excite man to madness [and] the law recognises it as the highest and the 
strongest [provocation].”  He showed Baxter could have legally provoked Will, but Gaston had 
to go further to settle that he actually did legally provoke Will.
260
 
Gaston ended the opinion with consideration of slaves’ humanity to establish a rule that 
would satisfy Will’s attorneys and influence future cases to come.  “We have no adjudged case 
that determines this question, or presents us with a precise rule by which to determine it,” he 
found.  State v. Mann did not apply because it only handled the battery of a slave by his master.  
It did, however, admit that masters could not kill their slaves.  Therefore, Gaston reasoned, “An 
attempt to take a slave’s life is then an attempt to commit a grievous crime, and may rightfully be 
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resisted.”  Gaston granted Mordecai’s hypothetical argument merit.  If a slave resisted his master 
in such an instance, he did not act with malice.  “Unless I see my way clear as a sunbeam,” 
Gaston wrote, “I cannot believe that this is the law of a civilised people and of a Christian land.”  
He continued, “I will not presume an arbitrary and inflexible rule so sanguinary in its character… 
and I see no law which compels me as a judge to infer malice contrary to the truth.”  Because 
“the prisoner is a human being, degraded indeed by slavery, but yet having ‘organs, dimensions, 
sense, affections, passions,’ like our own,” Gaston believed Will acted as any person would.  In 
consideration of his role as a slave – and therefore property – and his undeniably instinctual 
response, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled the lower court’s special verdict.  The 
court determined that Will had committed manslaughter and not murder.  Despite the court’s 
ruling, however, Will was not retried for the manslaughter of Richard Baxter.  Instead, his master 
sent him to Mississippi, where he would receive a capital sentence, after all.
261
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261
 Devereux and Battle, Reports of Cases, 171 and 172; George Gordon Battle, “The State of North Carolina v. 
Negro Will, a Slave of James S. Battle: A Cause Celebre of Ante-Bellum Times,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 
7 (Apr., 1920), 530. 
62 
 
Conclusion  
The outcome reached in State v. Will not only impacted Will.  While still interesting, the 
case would not be significant if that were true.  It solidified the limitation of a master’s power 
over his slave and granted slaves more protection within North Carolina’s institution of slavery.  
An examination of four cases that reached the North Carolina Supreme Court after State v. Will 
will show the effect the case had – as far as twenty years later.  The cases are State v. John 
Hoover, Martha Copeland v. John F. Parker, State v. Caesar, and State v. Christopher Robbins.  
Ranging from 1839 to 1855, the cases tackled some of the same issues as in State v. Will: a 
master’s power, the shooting of slaves, and slaves’ human passion.  Several people – such as 
Bartholomew Moore – appeared again, as well, and sometimes their stance on the law was at 
variance with a previous position.  Most importantly, however, these cases form the legacy of 
State v. Will, whether it is cited or not.  
Five years after State v. Will, in 1839, the North Carolina Supreme Court heard the case 
State v. John Hoover.
262
  A jury found Hoover guilty of the murder of his slave, Mira.  In the trial 
at the superior court, the judge told the jury they had to believe Hoover killed her without legal 
provocation in order to convict him of murder.  Had there been legal provocation, Hoover could 
only be found guilty of manslaughter.  The prisoner believed the jury’s charge to be incorrect, 
however the judge disagreed and sentenced him to death.  As a result, his case went on appeal to 
the higher court.  Attorney General J.R.J Daniel represented the state and Chief Justice Ruffin 
wrote the opinion that affirmed the trial judge’s sentence.263  The logical, pro-slavery Ruffin 
opened his opinion with the belief “that the case was left hypothetically to the jury[] much more 
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favourably for the prisoner than the circumstances authorized.”264  The circumstances Ruffin 
alluded to were the “series of the most brutal and barbarous whippings, scourgings and 
privations” Hoover committed against his pregnant slave.265  These punishments were 
supposedly a response to Mira’s theft of turnips, disobedience, and the attempted murder of his 
family through poison.  The only evidence for such crimes came from her coerced confessions. 
Ruffin used State v. Will to show that a master could be could be charged with the murder 
of his slave, and that Hoover should be as well.  As Ruffin stated in his decision in State v. Mann 
ten years prior, a master was allowed to punish his slave as he saw fit.  In State v. Hoover, he 
believed “the acts imputed to this unhappy man do not belong to a state of civilization,” and 
therefore did not result from a desire to simply punish or reform.  He cited State v. Will to prove 
“the killing of a slave may amount to murder; and this rule includes a killing by the master as 
well as that by a stranger.”  Hoover had committed murder, Ruffin wrote, because he did not kill 
Mira “in sudden heat of blood, but [his actions] must have flowed from a settled and malignant 
pleasure in inflicting pain, or a settled and malignant insensibility to human suffering.”  Ruffin 
determined that even if a master did not mean to kill his slave, if the slave died after he inflicted 
intentional “great bodily harm,” it was murder.  State v. Will therefore helped grant slaves more 
protection in North Carolina laws through State v. Hoover.
266
   
The later cases Martha Copeland v. John F. Parker and State v. Christopher Robbins also 
used principles discussed in State v. Will to further protect slaves.  In 1843, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court heard the Copeland case, in which an owner sought damages from an overseer 
who gave her hired-out slave a nonfatal shot wound.  The slave, Gilbert, received the wound 
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when he tried to run away to avoid punishment and the defendant shot him.  Parker did not 
believe he was wrong in doing so.  Justice Daniel wrote the opinion and determined Parker did 
act unlawfully.  While he did not cite State v. Will or any statute in his very short ruling, the 
material facts of the case were the same.  Parker, an overseer, shot Gilbert, a slave, who tried to 
run away from him.  Baxter did the same thing to Will in 1834.  Daniel wrote, “The slave was 
not in resistance to him, but was only retreating against his orders, [and Parker] had no right, we 
think, to use a deadly instrument to stop him.”267  In State v. Will, Gaston determined that Will’s 
running away did not amount to resistance, either.  Parker was entitled to punish the slave for 
running away, but “the act of shooting the slave betrayed passion in the overseer, rather than a 
desire to promote the true interest of his employers, or to keep up that subordination, which the 
state of our society demands.”268  Accordingly, he owed Copeland the damages he had caused.  
Had State v. Will never been decided, it is likely that Parker’s use of a deadly weapon would not 
have unlawful because of the precedent in State v. Mann.  In State v. Mann, the defendant used a 
gun, as well. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court made the rule that a master did not have the right to 
use a deadly weapon to punish his slave more explicit in State v. Christopher Robbins.  In 1855, 
Christopher Robbins cruelly killed his slave, Jim, with blows from an axe handle, beatings, 
stomping, a wagon-whip and heated water, for supposedly not feeding his horse.  Robbins’s 
attorney claimed that the death only amounted to manslaughter.  He wanted the judge to “charge 
the jury, that if a master is seen whipping his slave, the presumption is that he is rightfully 
whipping him,” but the court instead told the jury that a master could inflict non-fatal 
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punishment on his slave.
269
  When Robbins’s three step-children testified against him and 
relayed what had happened, the jury found him guilty of murder.  On appeal, Justice Battle 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, with the help of State v. Hoover and State v. Will.  He quoted 
the decision in State v. Hoover to counter the claim that Robbins had been legally provoked.  
Battle cited State v. Will as further evidence that Jim’s attempt to run away while “his master was 
beating him with a deadly weapon, and declaring that he intended to kill him” could not be 
considered legal provocation.
270
  With the precedent of State v. Hoover, which State v. Will 
influenced, and State v. Will itself supporting them, the North Carolina Supreme Court displayed 
a rejection of masters’ fatal cruelty against the unfortunate human beings over whom they had 
power.   
The idea of slaves as human beings took the center stage in the court case State v. 
Caesar, decided in 1849.  In State v. Caesar, the slave was the perpetrator in question and not the 
victim.  On August 14, 1848, the deceased, Kenneth Mizell, and his friend came upon Caesar 
and another slave named Dick.  The two intoxicated freemen told the slaves that they were 
patrollers and gave each slave “two or three slight blows” apparently not meant to cause much 
harm.  Drunken conversation followed, and when a third slave approached them, Mizell’s friend 
instructed Dick to procure a whip for him to use.  Dick made a few movements and then stopped, 
which caused the two white men to grab him and begin to beat him.  Dick “begged [him] to 
quit.”  Caesar took a rail from a nearby fence and struck at the men to protect his friend.  Caesar 
injured them both, however Mizell died in bed from his wounds.  The attorney general at the 
time was Bartholomew Moore, one of Will’s defense attorneys.  As counsel for the state, he 
argued Caesar’s actions constituted murder.  Caesar’s attorney, on the other hand, said the death 
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was manslaughter because Caesar, a “well-disposed negro,” acted “under the excitement of 
passion thus produced.”  It would be interesting to know Moore’s internal thoughts, as Caesar’s 
attorney used arguments Moore helped make feasible.  Caesar’s attorney went on to say that he 
did not consider his client’s weapon to be deadly, however the court determined that it was.  The 
judge told the jury if they believed Caesar had used it to kill Mizell, he was guilty of murder.  
Accordingly, the jury found Caesar guilty of murder and, with the accompanying capital 
sentence, the North Carolina Supreme Court heard the appeal.
271
 
The court ultimately decided to reverse the judgment and grant Caesar a new trial.  The 
decision was not unanimous because Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin vehemently dissented.  
Because each justice wrote an opinion for the case, the material is too extensive to cover in full 
here.  However, it should be noted that Justices Pearson and Nash believed Caesar had been 
legally provoked, a decision likely aided by State v. Will.  Justice Pearson said Caesar’s action 
“must be attributed, not to malice, but to a generous impulse, excited by witnessing injury done 
to a friend.”  State v. Will made the acknowledgment of a slave’s “passion” and human response 
to strangers attacking a friend possible.  Justice Pearson claimed the murder charge in State v. 
Will, in light of State v. Mann, could have been upheld, “except for an allowance for the feelings 
of nature.”272  
William Gaston’s liberal stance in State v. Will helped pave the way for further 
acceptance of slaves’ passions in North Carolina.  He adhered to his state’s history of gradual 
progress in slave treatment and rejected a stance that would have held slaves to an inhuman 
standard.  With the help of fair legal processes afforded to slaves and legal precedent, historian 
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John S. Bassett claimed the case “was a triumph of humanity and served to commit [North 
Carolina’s] law of slavery to a more lenient policy than existed in some other states.”273  The 
“triumph of humanity” came from the acknowledgment of slaves’ humanity and the 
corresponding expansion of acceptable slave responses within the institution of slavery, 
evidenced in the later cases. 
The case is noteworthy for that expansion, especially in light of the society from which it 
came.  North Carolina society was entrenched in the institution of slavery.  In light of events 
such as David Walker’s Appeal and Nat Turner’s Rebellion which occurred only a few years 
before the North Carolina Supreme Court heard State v. Will, it would be reasonable to assume 
that all progress in slave law would have been halted.  The objective of the ruling class to keep 
their property submissive was always a concern.  The defense and prosecution in State v. Will 
each offered the court their take on the issue of how the case could affect the institution of 
slavery.  Defense attorney Moore believed to accept his client’s and other slaves’ human 
responses to attempts to take their lives would not harm slavery.  Attorney General Daniel, of 
course, disagreed.  He thought to give what were supposed to be submissive pieces of property 
further allowances would create a catalyst, eventually, for emancipation. 
Although Gaston ruled in Will’s favor, it does not mean that he agreed with Moore’s 
claim that the decision would not weaken slavery.  Even though he owned slaves, in 1832, 
Gaston gave a talk before the Philanthropic and Dialectic Societies at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill in which he said, “It is slavery which, more than any other cause, keeps 
us back in the career of improvement.” 274  Gaston believed slavery was “fatal to economy and 
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providence… and poisons morals at the fountain head.”275  He did not hold the belief that slavery 
was a ‘positive good,’ and so, perhaps, he would not have mourned the weakening of the 
institution.  In either event, his decision benefitted slaves by ruling that they could defend their 
lives from their masters and not be charged with murder.  Whether his decision benefitted slave 
society is another matter. 
Society did not always have the final say in legal matters, however it certainly did 
influence the court case.  The actors in the events of State v. Will were likely influenced by the 
southern honor system.  The ways in which honor may have worked to influence those involved 
varied by his station in society.  Even those in the same class, however, could react in different 
ways.  Still, the southern honor system is one basis from which the actions of those involved can 
be understood.  Even in the initial altercation between the Allen and Will, the concept of honor 
can be applied.  As the slave foreman, Allen had the authority to instruct slaves and when Will 
challenged that, Allen might have believed his reputation and honor to be at stake.  Historian 
Bertram Wyatt-Brown stated that “slaves, like their masters, did have a sense of honor that 
applied to their sphere.”276  In his role as overseer, Baxter clearly had authority over Will, and if 
George Gordon Battle’s account that Will “produced the impression of sullenness and 
insubordination” due to a stutter is true, honor required Baxter to react.277  The action of James 
Battle, Will’s owner, also makes sense in light of southern honor.  He could have held himself 
responsible for hiring an overseer who acted cruelly when his duty was to protect his slave. 
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Historian Ariela Gross asserts that slave cases “mattered to white Southerners because 
their self-understandings as white masters depend on their relationships to black slaves [and] 
putting black character on trial called white character into question as well.”278  The significant 
amount James Battle spent for Will’s defense gives this view credence.  The actions of the 
attorneys and judges do, as well.  Wyatt-Brown claimed “the moral focus was honor” in court 
cases, “and the reprisal for its violations was the opposite: the stigma of shame.”279  Each lawyer 
and judge had a good reputation after the case and so they must have argued appropriately within 
the context of the honor system.  The justices on the bench at the time of State v. Will, 
particularly Ruffin and Gaston, did not always agree, however they both garnered respect from 
society.  The lasting regard of the people is evident in how, in 1914, a bust of William Gaston 
joined the bust of Thomas Ruffin in North Carolina’s State Administration Building, where the 
state’s supreme court would meet.280   Clearly, the decision in State v. Will did not diminish the 
character of the justices in the eyes of North Carolina’s citizens. 
More important than how it affected the justices is how State v. Will affected North 
Carolina’s slaves.  Evidence presented in the form of subsequent court cases shows that it 
benefitted at least a few slaves, although the total lives touched was probably much higher.  
Before the court made its decision, though, the justices had to contend with legal and social 
issues.  One over-looming concern was the effect the case would have on the institution of 
slavery in North Carolina.  In the end, a regard for slaves’ humanity triumphed and drove the 
relative liberalism of slave law espoused in the case.  
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Although the decision in State v. Will furthered progress in the acceptance of humanity in 
North Carolina slave law, it did not completely vindicate Will.  The qualified ruling did not 
hinder the success of the case, though.  Gaston ruled, according to the trial jury’s special verdict, 
that Will was guilty of manslaughter.  Although it did not go so far as to leave Will completely 
blameless, as a slave, a manslaughter charge could not have been tremendously troublesome, at 
least in relation to the death sentence a murder charge would incur.  Kemp Battle, the son-in-law 
of Will’s owner, said that Will had been branded to indicate his crime of manslaughter.281  He 
also wrote that the family “deemed [it] best to sell him to a planter in Alabama.”282  James 
Battle’s grandson, George Gordon Battle, seemed to be more certain of Will’s life after the court 
case.  George Gordon Battle wrote that Will had been discharged of the crime, after which James 
Battle, “doubtless wishing to remove him from the scene of so much tragedy,” had Will  moved 
to one of his plantations in Mississippi.
283
  Unfortunately for Will, trouble followed him there 
and prevented his happy ending.  While in Mississippi, Battle reported that Will “killed another 
slave and was eventually hung.”284  Will’s wife, who had accompanied him, later came back to 
North Carolina and proclaimed, “Will sho’ly had hard luck.”285  Sadly, what could have been a 
story of victory ultimately ended in defeat.   
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